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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION UNDER THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-CANON 4
I. INTRODUCTION
Grave shadows of suspicion were cast upon the time honored
privilege of confidentiality recently when two New York attorneys
admitted concealing their knowledge that their client, whom they
were defending for one murder, had committed several other un-
reported murders.' Adverse public reaction stimulated a criminal
investigation against the attorneys.2 The problems that surround
the use of confidential information are not confined to the criminal
lawyer; they affect all lawyers-the corporate lawyer,3 the securi-
ties lawyer,4 and all lawyers involved in any civil litigation.
5
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 6 which gov-
erns an attorney's duty regarding information received because of
1. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1974, at 1, col. 2. The enormity of the burden
borne by the attorneys was increased when Earl Petz, father of one of the
victims, Susan Petz, contacted attorney Frank Armani. Petz was searching
for his missing daughter who had disappeared at the same time and in the
same vicinity as the murder, which Armani's client was accused of commit-
ting, had occurred. Petz asked Armani if he knew anything about his
daughter. Armani denied knowing anything, even though he knew that Su-
san Petz had been stabbed to death by his client. Id.
2. The District Attorney's Office in Onondaga County, New York, the
scene of the murders, presented evidence to a grand jury for a decision on
whether charges should be lodged against the attorneys. One report said
that the grand jury would be asked whether the evidence warranted charg-
ing the attorneys with violating three public health laws requiring that
everyone be given a decent burial or cremation, that every death be regis-
tered within 72 hours, and that any person with knowledge of a death report
it to the coroner. NEWSDAY, July 5, 1974, at 6. On February 7, 1975, two
sealed indictments were handed down, and one of the attorneys was cleared
of any criminal wrongdoing. N.Y. Times, February 8, 1975, at 42, col. 5.
3. See, e.g., Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.
1973); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
4. See, e.g., Meyerhoff v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190
(2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3148 (U.S. Sept. 18, 1974) (No.
292).
5. See, e.g., In re Callan, 122 N.J. Super. 479, 300 A.2d 868, afj'd, 126
N.J. Super. 103, 312 A.2d 881 (1973); Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 448 P.2d
490 (1968).
6. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited as
ABA CODE]. The Code was adopted by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association on August 12, 1969. It supplanted the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics, which formerly governed attorney conduct.
The Code is organized into Canons, which are statements of "axiomatic
norms" expressing "the standards of professional conduct expected of law-
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his relationship with his clients, provides: "A lawyer should pre-
serve the confidences and secrets of a client." This duty is enforced
by Disciplinary Rules7 which require that a lawyer not knowingly
reveal a confidence or secret of his client except in certain situa-
tions.8
The purpose of this Comment is twofold. First, to ascertain
the scope of a lawyer's ethical duty it will examine the meaning
of the terms "confidence" and "secret." Second, it will examine
the area of confidential communications to demonstrate how vigor-
ously courts enforce this duty and to delineate the circumstances
where a lawyer may properly disclose the information and those
where he must disclose it. The intention is to discuss the attorney's
privileges and duties regarding his use of confidential information
as outlined by the Code. The discussion is not limited to Pennsyl-
vania, except when reference to the law of a particular state is
necessary.
II. INFORMATION PROTECTED By CANON 4
Canon 4 of the Code and its conjunctive ethical considerations
and disciplinary rules make no substantive change in the settled
principles of ethics involving the preservation of confidential in-
formation.9 The primary guide to the lawyer under the Canons
of Professional Responsibility, which formerly governed attorney
conduct, was Canon 37.10 Both old Canon 37 and new Canon 4 im-
yers," Ethical Considerations, which are aspirations that every lawyer
should strive for, and Disciplinary Rules that "state the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to discipli-
nary action." Id. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
7. Id. DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-101 [hereinafter cited as DR].
8. Id. DR 4-101(C) (lists excepted circumstances); see notes 63-66
and accompanying text infra.
9. R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICs 65 (2d ed. 1970).
10. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETICs No. 37 provided:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences.
This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well
to his employees; and neither of them should accept employment
which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confi-
dences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his em-
ployees or to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge
and consent, and even though there are other available sources of
such information. A lawyer should not continue employment when
he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of his
full duty to his former or to his new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from
disclosing the truth in respect to the accusation. The announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences he is bound to respect. He may properly make such
disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those
against whom it is threatened.
pose a duty upon the lawyer to preserve the confidences of his cli-
ent. New Canon 4 speaks not only to the confidences of the client
but also to his "secrets," which the Code defines as information that
the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client.11 This addition
of the word "secrets" was probably not meant to expand the lati-
tude of the lawyer's duty, but merely to clarify that the lawyer
must protect more than just the information which is protected by
the attorney-client privilege. 12 This could be implied from the use
of the word "confidences" in old Canon 37,13 but the addition of
the word "secrets" eliminates any ambiguity.
For an attorney to know what information he must preserve,
some understanding of the meaning of the terms "confidence" and
"secrets" is required. Both terms are defined in the Code; 14 the
purpose of this section is to explain and interpret the definitions
given in the Code with the hope of furthering an understanding
of what information is embraced by the lawyer's duty.
A. Confidences-The Attorney-Client Privilege
DR 4-101(A) defines "confidence" as "information protected by
the attorney-client privilege under applicable law." Consequently,
the lawyer has an ethical duty to preserve any information which
falls within the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
Today, the attorney-client privilege has been embodied in stat-
utes in most jurisdictions.15 In Pennsylvania, the law is the same
11. ABA CODE, DR 4-101(A).
12. R. WISE, supra note 9.
13. Several factors indicate that "confidences" under old Canon 37 in-
cluded more than just information protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. Canon 37 states that the information should be preserved "even
though there are other available sources of such information." If there are
other available sources of the information, this might tend to indicate that
the information was not of a confidential nature and hence the attorney-
client privilege might not be applicable; still, the lawyer was obligated to
protect it. And Canon 37 specifically declared that the "announced inten-
tion of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences
[the attorney] is bound to respect." If confidences under Canon 37 only
referred to information protected by the attorney-client privilege, as it does
in the Code, this sentence would have been unnecessary since the client's
announced intention to commit a crime is not protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, and so would not be a confidence at all. E.g., Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932). The logical conclusion is that "confidence" under
Canon 37 included more than information protected by the attorney-client
privilege. See also H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETICS 135 (1953).
14. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (A).
15. For a complete list of statutes covering the attorney-client privi-
lege see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 555
n.2 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 8 WIGMORE].
The privilege was recognized as early as 1577. Berd v. Lovelace, 21
Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577). Today, its existence is justified on the basis of
social policy:
In a society as complicated in structure as ours and governed by
laws as complex and detailed as those imposed upon us, expert le-
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for both civil 6 and criminal 17 proceedings:
Nor shall counsel be competent or permitted to testify to
confidential communications made to him by his client, or
the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in
either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the
client.'8
In most jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, the incorporation of
the common law rule of the privilege into statute has not changed
the essentials of the privilege.19 Before the privilege can be as-
serted by the attorney several conditions must be met.
First, the party must be seeking legal advice of some type,
20
although it need not be sought for the purpose of litigation.21 Gen-
erally, any matter discussed with a professional legal adviser is
prima facie for the sake of legal advice, unless it clearly appears
to concern a matter which does not require legal advice.
22 Of
course, the privilege will not protect the client who consults a law-
yer for advice on how to commit a crime or engage in some other
wrongful conduct.
2
gal advice is essential. To the furnishing of such advice fullest
freedom and honesty of communication of pertinent facts is a pre-
requisite. To induce clients to make such communication, the priv-
ilege to prevent their later disclosure is said by courts and com-
mentators to be a necessity. The social good derived from the
proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their cli-
ents is believed to outweigh the harm that may come from the sup-
pression of the evidence in specific cases.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210, comment (1942). 'For a thorough evalu-
ation of the privilege see Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 8 VILL. L. REV. 279 (part I), 469 (part II) (1963).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 321 (1958).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 686 (1964).
18. Notes 16 and 17 supra.
19. 8 WIGMORE § 2292, at 556.
20. Id. § 2294.
21. The rationale for this was aptly stated in Greenough v. Gaskell, 39
Eng. Rep. 618, 620 (Ch. 1833): "[A] person oftentimes requires the aid of
professional advice upon the subject of his rights and his liabilities, with no
reference to any particular litigation, and without any other reference to
litigation generally . . . [because] all human affairs may . . . become the
subject of judicial inquiry." In fact, by encouraging people to seek legal
advice at the nonlitigious stage, the necessity of litigation is often avoided.
22. 8 WIGMORE § 2296. For examples of specific circumstances see id.
at 567 n.2.
23. E.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932); Alexander v. United
States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076 (9th
Cir. 1971); 8 WIGMORE § 2298, at 573 n.l. This is commonly referred to as
the crime-tort exception to the privilege. The privilege does not apply in
these situations because it would not forward the policy of the privilege:
the administration of justice is not served by protecting a client who seeks
advice to carry out an illegal or fraudulent scheme. C. MCCORMICK, Mc-
ConucK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 194 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinaf-
The advice must be sought from a professional legal adviser2 4
in his capacity as such. 25 A mere discussion with an attorney upon
the law without any purpose of treating his opinion as a service
professionally rendered is not privileged; the person must be seek-
ing the benefit of that relation.
26
The communication must be relevant to the purpose of the con-
sultation for the privilege to exist.27 If a client knowingly departs
from his purpose, he is, in that respect, not seeking legal advice,
and the communication is not protected.2s The test is "whether
the statement is made as a part of the purpose of the client to obtain
advice on that subject.
'29
Another condition that must be met before the privilege at-
taches is that the communication must be made in confidence 30 and
come from the client.,' There is no presumption of confidentiality
simply because the attorney-client relation exists.8 2 Whether the
communication was of a sort intended to be confidential will be
implied from the circumstances.3 3 If the client intended to divulge
the information to others, or related it to the attorney so he could
relay it to others, then it is normally held not to be privileged.34
Likewise, communications to an attorney in the presence of a third
ter cited as McCoRMICK]. Courts are hesitant to grant the exception and
require more than just an accusation of criminal or fraudulent purpose;
there must be prima facie evidence that the accusation has some foundation
in fact. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1932).
24. For purposes of the privilege "lawyer" is defined as any person au-
thorized or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized to practice
law in any state or nation whose law recognizes the privilege. UNiFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE 26 (3) (c).
25. 8 WiGMORE § 2300.
26. Id. § 2304, at 586. It is not necessary that the attorney be charging
a fee. Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1944). Any pre-
liminary communications while negotiating for a retainer are within the
privilege regardless of whether the attorney accepts the retainer. United
States v. Funk, 84 F. Supp. 967, 968 (E.D. Ky. 1949), aff'd sub nom., Prich-
ard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950).
27. 8 WIGMORE §§ 2306-10.
28. E.g., Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352, 354 (5th
Cir. 1942).
29. 8 WIGMORE § 2310, at 599 (emphasis added).
30. Id. §§ 2311-16.
31. Id. §§ 2317-2320.
32. E.g., Collette v. Sarrasin, 184 Cal. 283, 193 P. 571 (1920); Mackel
v. Burtlett, 33 Mont. 123, 82 P. 795 (1905); Vance v. State, 190 Tenn. 521,
230 S.W.2d 987 (1950). "A past attorney-client relationship does not, of it-
self, preclude an attorney from ever testifying against a former client on
new and separate issues." Glass v. Heyd, 457 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1972).
33. Hiltpold v. Stern, 82 A.2d 123 (D.C. Mun. App. 1951).
34. E.g., United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1963); Col-
ton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962) (information transmitted
by client to attorney for inclusion in tax return held not privileged); United
States v. Telier, 255 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1958) (attorney was to set forth the
conversation in a letter to client with copies to go to others; not privileged);
Heaton v. Findlay, 12 Pa. 304 (1849) (communication of facts to be em-




party who is not an agent of either the client or the attorney tend
to indicate that the communication is not confidential. Any com-
munication through any agency of the client will be deemed to have
come from the client.36 But readily observable information which
is not made observable for the purpose of a communication is not
privileged."7
The privilege protects both the attorney and the client from
compelled disclosure,3 8 but the right to assert it belongs to the
client.3 9 Once claimed, 40 the trial judge determines whether the
facts justify granting it,41 and absent a flagrant disregard of the
law by the judge, the attorney must submit to his decision. 42 The
privilege will not prohibit or protect third parties who obtain
knowledge of the communication either by overhearing it43 or by
surreptitiously reading or obtaining possession of a document.
44
Protection of the privilege may be waived by the client either
expressly or impliedly.4 By failing to claim the privilege by ob-
jecting to a disclosure, 46 or testifying47 or calling the attorney to
35. E.g., Gordon v. Robinson, 109 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Lout-
zenhiser v. Dodds, 436 Pa. 512, 260 A.2d 745 (1970); Tracy v. Tracy, 377 Pa.
420, 105 A.2d 123 (1954).
36. See Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1250 (1942).
37. E.g., Clark v. Skinner, 334 Mo. 1190, 70 S.W.2d 1094 (19'34) (attor-
ney's knowledge of client's mental capacity not privileged); State v. Fitz-
gerald, 68 Vt. 125, 34 A. 429 (1896) (attorney's testimony to client's intoxi-
cation, observable by all, not privileged); 8 WIGMORE § 2306.
38. E.g., In re Turner, 51 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Ky. 1943); 8 WIcmoaE §§
2324-26.
39. E.g., Boyd v. Kilmer, 285 Pa. 533, 132 A. 709 (1926); Dowie's Estate,
135 Pa. 210, 19 A. 936 (1890); 8 WxGMORE §§ 2321-23.
40. If the client is not a party to the cause of action where the attor-
ney is called to testify, courts generally refuse to allow someone who is a
party to assert the privilege on behalf of the client. E.g., State v. Madden,
161 Minn. 132, 201 N.W. 297 (1924); Dowie's Estate, 135 Pa. 210, 19 A. 936
(1890). Some courts permit anyone present to call it to the court's atten-
tion. E.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
1967) (client's attorney); O'Brien v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109
Kan. 138, 197 P. 1100 (1921) (client's attorney or party).
41. 8 WIGMORE § 2322, at 630.
42. Id. § 2321, at 630; McCoRImicK § 92, at 193-94.
43. E.g., Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 75, 6 So. 396 (1889) (conversation be-
between attorney and client in jailer's presence; held jailer's testimony not
privileged); People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App. 2d 653, 315 P.2d 79 (1957)
(court reporter); Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953) (telephone operator).
44. 8 WIGMORE § 2326, at 634.
45. Id. §§ 2327-29; McCoRIUCK § 93.
46. McCoRMICK § 93, at 194. But see People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d
436, 277 P.2d 94 (1955).
47. E.g., General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Savage, 35
testify to48 a privileged communication, the client implicitly waives
the privilege.
All the components just discussed are necessary elements which
must be present for the attorney-client privilege to apply to a spe-
cific situation. As Wigmore summarizes them:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a
professional adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the com-
munications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confi-
dence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by his legal
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
49
If one of these prerequisites is not satisfied, then the attorney-client
privilege will not protect a client from disclosure of information
by his attorney on the witness stand. An attorney who fails to
reveal the information when he is ordered to do so by the court
may be subject to a contempt citation.50
Even though the information cannot be protected from com-
pelled disclosure, the attorney is not free to disclose the information
sua sponte. He has an ethical obligation to preserve, not only that
information which is protected by the attorney-client privilege, but
also information which does not fall within the protection of the
attorney-client privilege-his client's secrets.51
B. Secrets
DR 4-101 (A) defines secrets as "other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held in-
violate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client." Since the Code is rela-
tively new, and since the Canons of Professional Ethics did not con-
tain a similar distinction between "confidences" and "secrets",
cases interpreting the word "secret" are scarce.
The recent case of City of Wichita v. Chapman5 2 confronted
this problem. In that case, an attorney was representing a client
whose property the city was attempting to condemn. The attor-
ney's firm had represented the city in a previous condemnation pro-
ceeding, and during the course of that representation the firm had
F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1929); People v. Gerald, 265 Il. 448, 107 N.E..165 (1914);
People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 126 N.E. 559 (1955).
48. E.g., Brooks v. Holden, 175 Mass. 137, 55 N.E. 802 (1900); 8 WIG-
MORE § 2327.
49. 8 WIcMoRE § 2292, at 554. See United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) for a similar formulation.
50. See Appeal of the United States Securities & Exchange Comin'n,
226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955); Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490
(1968).
51. ABA CODE, EC 4-4 provides in part: "The attorney-client privilege
is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confi-
dences of his client."
52. 214 Kan. 575, 521 P.2d 589 (1974).
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received from the city a report of a real estate expert valuing cer-
tain comparable property. In the current condemnation proceeding
by the city against the attorney's client, the city employed the same
real estate expert and he valued the same property, which he had
valued in the previous proceeding, at a substantially lower rate.
The attorney used the report that his firm had gained in the prior
proceeding to discredit the expert's lower valuation in this case.
The city contended the report Was a "secret," and by using it the
attorney violated Canon 4. In rejecting the city's argument the
court discussed the prerequisites necessary for the attorney-client
privilege to apply and concluded that these should also apply to
determine what is a "secret." Applying this rule, the court held
that the "public exposure" in making the report available to various
agencies and individuals negated its "secret" or "confidential" char-
acter.513
Language in the Code seems to dictate a different result than
the City of Wichita court reached. The Code explicitly states that
"the attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical ob-
ligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his
client," 4 and the ethical obligation "exists without regard to the
nature or source of information or the fact that others share the
knowledge." 55 Clearly, this precludes application of the attorney-
client privilege standard to "secrets." The fact that the report was
made available to others is relevant in ascertaining whether the
attorney-client privilege exists 56 but not to whether the matter was
"secret.' 7 Utilizing the definition of "secret" from the Code, 5 the
report was "information gained in the professional relationship,"
its disclosure was "detrimental to the client;" consequently, it was
a "secret" that the lawyer had a duty to preserve,59 and having
failed to, he should have been disciplined.60
III. DISCLOSURES
Generally, any information protected by Canon 4, whether it
is a "confidence" or a "secret," may not be revealed by an attor-
53. Id. at 582, 521 P.2d at 596.
54. ABA CODE, EC 4-4.
55. Id.
56. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
57. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
58. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (A).
59. Id. DR 4-101(B) (1), (2), (3).
60. Violation of a disciplinary rule subjects a lawyer to discipline. Id.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT; PA. R. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 17-3.
ney. 1 Revealing it will subject the lawyer to discipline.62 How-
ever, there are certain situations where a lawyer may, and in some
cases must, reveal his client's confidences or secrets. These include:
(1) when he has the consent of his client after making full dis-
closure to him;63 (2) when permitted under the disciplinary rules
or required by law or court order;84 (3) when his client intends
to commit a crime; 5 and (4) when it is necessary to establish or
collect his fee, or to defend himself against an accusation of wrong-
ful conduct.6 6 The purpose of this section is to discuss how courts
protect clients from the damaging use of information by an attor-
ney, and also to delineate and explain those situations where an
attorney may, and those situations where he must. disclose informa-
tion received from his client.
A. Protection for the Client-The Lawyer's Duty
and Its Enforcement
Subject to the exceptions enumerated in DR 4-101(C),67 a law-
yer may not reveal any "confidence" or "secret" of his client6 ,
Courts vigorously enforce this duty in both criminal
9 and civil70
cases.
The lawyer's competing interests71 as advocate for his client
and "officer of the court" most acutely manifest themselves in rep-
61. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (B).
62. PA. R. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 17-3. The discipline may be
any of the following: (1) disbarment; (2) suspension for a maximum of
five years; (3) public censure; (4) private reprimand; (5) private informal
admonition. Id. 17-4.
63. ABA CONE, DR 4-101 (C) (1).
64. Id. DR 4-101 (C) (2).
65. Id. DR 4-101 (C) (3).
66. Id. DR 4-101 (C) (4).
67. See note 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
68. Id. DR 4-101 (B).
69. See notes 71-86 and accompanying text infra.
70. See notes 120-129 and accompanying text infra.
71. The Canons of Professional Ethics and case law imposed a dual
role upon a lawyer. Canon 15 provided that the lawyer owed "entire devo-
tion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end
that nothing be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law, le-
gally applied." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 15. Cases spoke
in similar language. E.g., People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Beattie, 137 Ill.
553, 27 N.E. 1096 (1891). But it was also recognized that the lawyer was
an "officer of the court." E.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378
(1866); In re Cohen, 370 F. Supp. 1166, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 197.3); In re Kelly,
243 F. 696, 705 (D.C. Mont. 1917); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y.
465, 473, 162 N.E. 487, 490 (1928); Sterling v. City of Philadelphia, 378 Pa.
538, 544, 106 A.2d 793, 796 (1954) ; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No.
22.
The Code of Professional Responsibility has attempted to eliminate any
inconsistency in a lawyer's duty by declaring that his duty to his client and
the court is the same: "to represent his client zealously within the bounds
of the law .. " ABA CODE, EC 7-1, EC 7-19. While the problem thus be-
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resenting a criminal defendant. The criminal defense attorney has
a heavy burden to protect his client's confidences. Even if the client
admits to his attorney that he is guilty of the crime charged, the
attorney may not disclose that admission voluntarily and is barred
from testifying to that effect.7 2 Besides fulfilling the policy behind
the privilege,7 8 this promotes the constitutional guarantees of effec-
tive assistance of counsel 4 and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.7 5 Both these rights would be ineffectual if it were held that
a client, who admits his guilt to counsel in order to insure counsel's
effective assistance, thereby waives his privilege against self-in-
crimination.76 Guilty persons are entitled to counsel to guarantee
they receive a fair trial.7 7 It is the duty of the legal profession
to provide such counsel;78 an attorney's belief that a defendant,
whom he represents as appointed counsel, is guilty is not a "com-
pelling reason" for excusing him from that representation.79 Once
a lawyer undertakes the representation of an accused, he is bound
to use all available defenses,80 "[1]ike a soldier he must use the
weapons and the practices that are available to him,"'" and he must
not use any information "to the disadvantage of his client."8 2
Courts will not permit an attorney in a criminal case to testify
to any communication which deserves the protection of the attor-
ney-client privilege. For example, in Cummings v. Common-
wealth,8 3 the prosecution introduced the testimony of a former at-
torney for the defendant which established a motive for the murder
the defendant allegedly committed: he was having illicit relations
with the victim's wife. The court held it was error to admit the
testimony over the defendant's objection; the judgment was re-
versed and the case remanded.8 4 In another case, State v. Sulli-
comes determining whether a particular course of conduct is "within the
bound of the law," it is doubtful that the competing considerations have
been eliminated.
72. People v. Singh, 123 Cal. App. 365, 11 P.2d 73 (1932).
73. See note 15 supra.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). -
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
77. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-68 (1932).
78. ABA CODE, CANON 2.
79. Id. EC 2-29.
80. Id. EC 7-4.
81. Stayton, Cum Honore Officium, 19 TEx. B.J. 765, 766 (1956).
82. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (B) (2). Of course, this is subject to the ex-
ceptions of DR 4-101 (C).
83. 221 Ky. 301, 209 S.W. 943 (1927).
84. Id. at 311-12, 298 S.W. at 947-48.
van, 5 the court afforded a defendant protection against the intro-
duction of an incriminating conversation that was the fruit of a
privileged communication. The defendant had contacted her at-
torney and informed him that she had murdered her husband. The
attorney notified the sheriff of the location of the body. At trial,
the prosecution called the attorney to the witness stand and ques-
tioned him about his conversation with the sheriff, delicately avoid-
ing any reference to any conversation with the defendant which
would have permitted the attorney to invoke the attorney-client
privilege. Even though the conversation itself was not privileged,
the court held that its admission was prejudicial since it was likely
the jury inferred that the attorney gained his information from the
defendant, and this violated the protection afforded by the attor-
ney-client privilege.8 6 This court extended the protection of the
privilege to what, in reality, was a non-privileged communication
demonstrating the respect courts afford to communications pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.
Notwithstanding judicial insistence that the attorney preserve
information revealed to him by his client, the criminal defense at-
torney must conduct himself within the bounds of the law.8 7 He
may not use the attorney-client relationship as a shield or justifi-
cation for actively participating in the concealment or destruction
of evidence. For example, in the case of In re Ryder,88 attorney
Ryder voluntarily took possession of stolen money and a sawed-
off shotgun which had been secreted in a safe-deposit box by his
client who was about to be charged with bank robbery. Ryder
rented a safe-deposit box in his own name and transferred the evi-
dence to it from the adjacent safe-deposit box of his client. He
defended his conduct as a perfectly legitimate attempt to act in his
client's best interests, since by concealing the evidence he would
avoid the presumption of guilt which would arise if the weapon
and money were found in his client's possession. Neither the trial8 9
nor the appellate court90 recommended what course Ryder should
have pursued,91 but he was suspended from practice for eighteen
months because his acts bore "no reasonable relation to the at-
torney-client privilege and the duty to refuse to divulge a client's
confidential communication.
92
85. 60 Wash. 2d 214, 373 P.2d 474 (1962).
86. Id. at 218, 373 P.2d at 476.
87. ABA CODE, CANON 7.
88. 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967),
noted in 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 133 (1968).
89. 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967).
90. 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
91. For an intensive examination of Ryder's alternatives see Comment,
Professional Responsibility and In re Ryder: Can An Attorney Serve Two
Masters?, 54 VA. L. REV. 145, 190 (1968).
92. 381 F.2d at 714.
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However, in another case, State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell,93 an
attorney's possession of the instrumentalities of a crime was
granted limited protection. The attorney had refused to comply
with a subpoena duces tecum which ordered him to appear at a
coroner's inquest and bring with him any knives he had in his pos-
session as a result of his relationship with certain named persons,
one of whom he was defending against a charge of murdering the
person whose death was the subject of the inquest. The state su-
preme court upheld the attorney's refusal to comply with the order
saying compliance would have required the attorney to testify to
matters arising out of the attorney-client relationship. 94 But it
qualified its holding and instructed the attorney on what it ex-
pected him to do with the evidence:
We do not. . . mean to imply that evidence can be perma-
nently withheld by the attorney.... The attorney should
not be a depository for criminal evidence. . . . [A]fter a
reasonable period [the attorney] should, as an officer of the
court, on his own motion turn the same over to the prose-
cution."95
In order to guarantee that the client's privilege of communication
with his attorney was protected, the court ordered the prosecution
to make certain that the source of the evidence was not disclosed
in the presence of the jury. 6
Some basic guidelines emerge from the Ryder9 T and Olwel 98
cases. First, an attorney's continued possession of the fruits or in-
strumentalities of a crime will not be protected by the attorney-
client privilege. 99 Second, an attorney in possession of the articles
of his client's crime may be disciplined if he attempts to conceal
them. 0 0 Finally, some courts impose an affirmative duty upon him
to deliver the evidence to the prosecution.' 0 ' This latter rule pro-
motes the public interest in the administration of justice, while the
court's refusal to permit the prosecution to divulge the source of
the evidence 02 provides some protection for the client. It may
93. 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964).
94. Id. at 833, 394 P.2d at 684.
95. Id. at 833-34, 394 P.2d at 684-85.
96. Id.
97. See notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text supra.
99. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (1967); State ex rel. Sowers v. 01-
well, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 833-34, 394 P.2d 681, 684-85 (1964).
100. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713 (1967).
101. State ex rel. Sowers v. Qiwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 833-34, 394 P.2d 681,
684-85 (1964).
102. Id.
have the practical effect of discouraging a client from revealing evi-
dence of his crime to his attorney, but it will also prevent the at-
torney from becoming the "depository of criminal evidence."
Surely, logic compels the conclusion that a client should not be able
to protect or conceal evidence of his crime by placing it in the hands
of his attorney. 0 3
In addition to subjecting the attorney to professional discipline,
some decisions suggest that the attorney may be- convicted as an
accessory after the fact for actively participating in the destruction
or concealment of evidence. 10 4 In Pennsylvania, a person may be
convicted of the offense of hindering apprehension or prosecution if
he conceals or destroys evidence of a crime. 105 The law provides
no exemption for an attorney, and it is easy to envision an attorney
who takes possession of evidence of his client's crime being con-
victed under this statute.106 Since the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility requires an attorney to represent his client within the
bounds of the law,10 7 the concealment or destruction of evidence
which violates this statute would also be a violation of the Code.
Just as a lawyer may not conceal or destroy evidence himself,
neither can he advise his client to do so. In a Minnesota case, 08
an attorney advised her client to destroy a list made by a decedent
providing for the distribution of her estate. The attorney was dis-
barred for her "willful participation" in the destruction of this evi-
dence which she knew would be required in proceedings for the dis-
tribution of the estate. In a similar situation a Texas court' 0 9 said
it was not "in the legitimate course of professional employment"" 0
for an attorney to advise his client, who had just murdered his wife,
to dispose of the murder weapon.
Neither the courts nor the Code have squarely addressed the
103. See Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Mc-
CoRMICK § 89, at 185; 8 WIGMORE § 2307.
104. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967); Clark v. State, 159
Tex. Crim. R. 187, 193-94, 261 S.W.2d 339, 344 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
855 (1953). See also ABA COMM. ON PROFESSioNAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No.
155 (1936). Indeed, Jeremy Bentham maintained that any lawyer who
knows from the confession of his client that his client has committed a fel-
ony and enables him to avoid "suffering the punishment to which he is con-
demned," is an accessory after the fact. 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
474 (Bowring ed. 1842).
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5105 (a) (3) (1973). See also 18 U.S.C.
3 (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1970).
106. To be convicted, it is necessary that the party intend to hinder the
apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for crime.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5105 (a) (1973). Mere knowledge that the other
person has committed the crime is not sufficient. Commonwealth v. Gia-
cobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 19 A.2d 71 (1941).
107. ABA CODE, CANON 7.
108. In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4 (1946).
109. -Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. R. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, cert. denied,
346 U.S. 855 (1953).
110. Id. at 200, 261 S.W.2d at 347.
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problem of what a lawyer should do when his client confronts him
with incriminating evidence.111 The decisions, thus far, speak
mostly in negative terms: a lawyer may not take evidence into
his possession and conceal it;"' a lawyer may not advise the dis-
posal'13 or destruction '"4 of evidence. The Code gives a positive
command to the lawyer to represent his client zealously within the
bounds of the law,"" and then proceeds to list a number of acts
on the part of the lawyer which are clearly not within the bounds
of the law.1 16 Some commentators suggest that the lawyer's obliga-
tion is simply to advise his client of the incriminatory implications
of the evidence, and let the client decide what course to take." 7
Practically speaking, it is unreasonable to expect counselors not to
advise their clients of the potentially damaging legal implications
of a specific piece of evidence or information, but lawyers should
be aware that they may be disciplined for giving explicit advice
directing a client to a particular course of action, 8 or actually par-
ticipating in the destruction or concealment of evidence.119
The judicial balancing done to protect clients from damaging
disclosures by their lawyers in criminal cases is also extended to
civil litigants. The problem of a lawyer's taking advantage of infor-
mation received during an attorney-client relationship often arises
when the lawyer is employed in a civil suit against his former
111. See Comment, supra note 91.
112. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967).
113. Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. R. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953).
114. In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4 (1946).
115. ABA CODE, CANON 7.
116. Id. DR 7-102:
(A) In his representation of a client; a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial,
or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or
when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to har-
ass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted un-
der existing law, except that he may advance such claim or de-
fense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an ex-
tension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required
by law to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he
knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows
to be illegal or fraudulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary
to a Disciplinary Rule.
117. See Comment, supra note 91, at 191.
118. See notes 108-110 and accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 88-107 and accompanying text supra.
client.120 'The case of Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.121 ex-
emplifies the typical factual situation. The plaintiff was seeking
declaratory judgments that patents held by the defendant, Paten-
tex, were invalid and unenforceable because another defendant,
Burlington, by its alleged control of Patentex, has misused the
patents. Plaintiff's counsel had previously represented Burlington
in another patent infringement case1 22 which also called into ques-
tion the nature and scope of Burlington's control over Patentex.
The court, attempting to preserve the balance between an individ-
ual's right to his own freely chosen counsel and the need to preserve
the highest ethical standards of professional responsibility, disquali-
fied the plaintiff's counsel from the representation.
12'
In these situations courts apply a "strict prophylactic rule"'
124
disqualifying the attorney where "it can reasonably be said that
in the course of the former representation the attorney might have
acquired information related to the subject matter of his subse-
quent representation.' 1 25 No proof is required that he did, in fact,
receive such information. 26 The rule is aimed at protecting both
the attorney's former and present client: the attorney may uncon-
sciously use or manipulate a confidence acquired in the earlier rep-
resentation and transform it into a telling advantage, or he may
refrain from seizing a legitimate opportunity for fear that such a
tactic might give rise to an appearance of impropriety.
2
A case of this type128 has already been heard by the Disci-
120. See, e.g., Emle Indus., Inc. v; Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.
1973); In re Anonymous, No. 14, 1974 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.,
July 26, 1974), as reported in The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, Summaries of Discipline Imposed on Pennsylvania Attor-
neys During The Period July 1, 1974 through November 30, 1974 at 47, July
26, 1974. Typically, these cases arise when one party objects to his oppon-
ent's counsel, but it has been suggested that it is the court's duty to act sua
sponte in such a situation. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym,
Recreational & Athletic Equip. Corp., Inc., 357 F. Supp. 905, 908 (W.D. Pa.
1973).
121. 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1972).
122. Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. c. Alamance Indus., Inc., 191 F. Supp.
652 (M.D.N.C. 1961), aff'd, 299 F.2d 793 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 924
(1962).
123. 478 F.2d at 565.
124. Id. at 571.
125. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (emphasis added).
126. There can be no inquiry into whether the attorney did receive con-
fidential information during the previous employment because the only way
to determine if he did would be to describe in detail the information pre-
viously disclosed, and this would require the former client to forfeit the pro-
tection to which he is entitled. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d
562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
127. Id. "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety." ABA CODE, CANON 9.
128. In re Anonymous, No. 14, 1974 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.,
July 26, 1974), as reported in The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, Summaries of Discipline Imposed on Pennsylvania Attor-
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plinary Board in Pennsylvania. 129 In that case, the attorney, as
an Assistant County Solicitor, had participated in the promulgation
of county air pollution regulations after many conferences with
state technical, administrative and legal officials. Later, as a pri-
vate counselor, he was representing defendants who were charged
by the State with violations of the state air pollution regulations.
The Disciplinary Board dismissed the complaint against the attor-
ney on the ground that the attorney never had substantial responsi-
bility with respect to the state regulations, and never having been
employed by the State possessed no attorney-client confidences to
reveal. The significance of the case is to demonstrate that discipli-
nary action may be taken against an attorney for representing
someone against a former employer.
The client is also protected from the attorney's violating his con-
fidence by such action as withdrawing from the case or disassociat-
ing himself from the client. In any matter pending before any tri-
bunal, it is permissible for an attorney to request permission to
withdraw if his client insists on pursuing an illegal course of con-
duct,13 or insists that the lawyer pursue an illegal course, or a
course prohibited by the disciplinary rules.131 But even if the re-
quest is granted, the lawyer may not withdraw from the employ-
ment "until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable
prejudice to the rights of his client."'31 2 In fact, where the possi-
bility of prejudice is great, it may preclude withdrawal. For ex-
ample, in one case presented to the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics,13 3 an attorney had agreed to defend a young man accused
of a sexual offense after the young man's father had assured the
attorney of his son's innocence. The attorney accepted the case at
the request of the boy's father with the understanding that he
would be at liberty to withdraw from the case at any time if he
became convinced of the young man's guilt. The defendant made
admissions to the attorney which were inconsistent with his inno-
cence, and the attorney wanted to withdraw from the case. The
Committee's opinion concluded that it was the attorney's duty not
to withdraw since his withdrawal would amount to disclosure to the
defendant's family of the confidential information which he had re-
neys During The Period July 1, 1974 through November 30, 1974 at 47, July
26, 1974.
129. The Disciplinary Board was established by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. PA. R. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 17-5.
130. ABA CODE, DR 2-110(C) (1) (b).
131. Id. DR 2-101 (C) (1) (C).
132. Id. DR 2-110(A) (2).
133. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETMCS, OPnmoNs, No. 90 (1932).
ceived from his client. Similarly in another problem presented to
the ABA Committee. on Professional Ethics,134  the Committee
concluded that if a lawyer, who is representing a client before the
Internal Revenue Service, believes that the service is relying on
him as corroborating statements of his client, and the lawyer knows
his client's statements are false, then the lawyer has a duty to dis-
associate himself from any such reliance, unless it is obvious that
the very act of disassociation would have the effect of violating
his duty to preserve his client's confidences and secrets.
1 3 5
The above analysis sufficiently demonstrates that all attorneys,
criminal and civil, must be scrupulous in protecting their clients
confidences, and courts will vigorously defend clients from their
attorney's derelictions.
B. Information the Lawyer May Disclose Sua Sponte
The Code enumerates the circumstances where it is permissible
for a lawyer to voluntarily divulge confidential information. 13 6
With one exception to be discussed later,13 7 no affirmative ethical
duty is imposed upon the lawyer to reveal information in any of
the enumerated situations.138 Consequently, no disciplinary action
will result from a failure to reveal the information. Actually, the
enumerated situations are exceptions to the lawyer's duty to pre-
serve the confidences and secrets of his client,1 9 and in a sense,
are the lawyer's defenses to an accusation that he has violated this
ethical duty.
A lawyer may reveal the "confidences" or "secrets" of his client
when the client has consented to it after full disclosure by the at-
torney.' 40  Full disclosure entails a complete, detailed14' revelation
of what information is going to be divulged, and probably includes
informing the client of the purpose in divulging it, since consent
is defined as a voluntary acceptance of what is done or proposed
to be done by another,'1 4 2 and a person cannot consent to what the
lawyer intends to do, unless he is so informed. The client's consent
to the revelation of information for one purpose should not be taken
134. Id. No. 314 (1965).
135. Even-in this situation though, if a direct question is put to the law-
yer, he must advise the service that he is not in a position to answer. Id.
It seems likely that this opinion would be different in light of DR 7-102
(B) (1) of the Code which requires a lawyer to reveal any fraud perpe-
trated by his client if the client refuses to do so.
136. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (C).
137. See notes 170-190 and accompanying text infra.
138. DR 4-101 (C) simply states that a lawyer may reveal the informa-
tion, it does not say he must reveal it. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (C).
139. Id. DR 4-101 (B).
140. Id. DR 4-101 (C) (1).
141. See City of Orlando v. Evans, 132 Fla. 609, 618, 182 So. 264, 268
(1938).
142. See Lusby y. State, 217 Md. 191, 200, 141 A.2d 893, 898 (1958).
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as a blanket consent to divulge it for any purpose. 143 In order to
protect himself, the lawyer should not rely on an implied consent,
since it may be difficult to prove against a client who insists he
gave no such consent. Rather, the consent should be express, and,
as an additional precaution, the lawyer might do well to get his
client's authorization in writing.
Disclosure is also permitted when it is necessary to enforce or
protect the lawyer's rights. The Code expressly authorizes dis-
closures that are necessary for a lawyer to establish or collect his
fee.144 To collect his fee, he may use his knowledge of property
owned by the client even if this knowledge was obtained solely
through his professional relationship with his client; and, if grounds
for attachment exist, he may attach the property to compel his cli-
ent to pay his just fee. 14 5
Information gained solely because of the attorney-client rela-
tionship may also be used by the attorney to defend himself or his
employees against an accusation of wrongful conduct. 46 This pro-
vision of the Code was recently applied in the case of Meyerhoof
v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co.14 7 In this case, an attorney
resigned from a law firm because of the firm's unwillingness to
disclose a $200,000 fee they were receiving on a registration state-
ment they had filed in connection with a public offering made by
one of their clients. Upon resigning, he immediately appeared be-
fore the SEC and reported the omission. His testimony was em-
bodied in an affidavit, and when shareholders named him, among
others, as a defendant in a suit charging the statement was false
and misleading, the attorney furnished counsel for the shareholders
with a copy of the affidavit. The court concluded the attorney's
action was a proper response to the accusation of wrongful conduct,
but enjoined him from disclosing any more material information
except on discovery or at trial.' 4 This restriction demonstrates the
courts' insistence that even when it is permissible for an attorney
to make a particular disclosure, the extent of the disclosure is
limited by the purpose for which it is made. In this case, he could
only ethically disclose that information which was necessary for
his defense against the accusation.
143. See Eisenson Elec. Serv. Co. v. Wien, 30 Misc. 2d 926, 930, 219
N.Y.S.2d 736, 741 (1961).
144. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (C) (4).
145. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL E mcs, OPINIoNs, No. 250 (1943).
146. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (C) (4).
147. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3148
(U.S. Sept. 18, 1974) (No. 292).
148. Id. at 1195-96.
The lawyer may also reveal the confidences or secrets of his
client when they indicate that the client intends to commit a future
crime.149 "Crime" is not defined in the Code, but it generally refers
to "those wrongs which the government notices as injurious to the
public, and punishes in what is called a 'criminal proceeding.' "'"
In Pennsylvania, such a revelation is within the lawyer's discre-
tion,51 but the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice'
52
advises the lawyer "he must do so if the contemplated crime is one
which would seriously endanger the life or safety of any person
or corrupt the processes of the courts and the lawyer believes such
action on his part is necessary to prevent it."'15  This standard is
recommended by the ABA as a guide "to honorable practice," but
failure to conform to it will not subject an attorney to disciplinary
action.
16 4
Notwithstanding the non-obligatory nature of this provision,
some courts impose criminal penalties on an attorney for failing
to reveal his client's intention to commit a crime. In re Callan, 5
5
a recent New Jersey case, is an example. The attorneys' client,
a tenant association, had withheld rent and placed it in a rent strike
fund. The court ordered the association not to disburse the money
until it was determined at an upcoming hearing who had the legiti-
mate right to the fund. Prior to the hearing the attorneys learned
that their clients intended to distribute the fund, but did not inform
the court of this until the day of the hearing, after its distribution.
The court concluded the attorneys had an absolute duty to inform
the court of their client's intention to violate the court order and
rejected the attorney-client privilege defense saying, "[n]o one
rationally expects the law to protect from disclosure a deliberate
plan to defy the law and deprive another of his rights. . . . "16 The
attorneys were found in contempt of court. If this case is any indi-
cation of judicial temperament, attorneys should beware that courts
149. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (C) (3). How certain must a lawyer be that
his client intends to commit a crime? The ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics Lfas stated that the facts must indicate beyond a reasonable doubt
that a crime will be committed. ABA COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965).
150. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (4th ed. 1968).
151. See Comparative Analysis of American Bar Association Standards
for Criminal Justice with Pennsylvania Law, Rules and Legal Practice,
March 1, 1974, The Defense Function at 21. This study was undertaken by
the Joint Council on Criminal Justice Standards which was created in 1972
by the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Conference of State Trial
Judges.
152. ABA, THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved
Draft, 1971).
153. Id. The Defense Function § 3.7 (d).
154. Id. at 10.
155. 122 N.J. Super. 479, 300 A.2d 868, aff'd, 126 N.J. Super. 103, 312 A.2d
881 (1973).
156. 122 N.J. Super. at 496, 300 A.2d at 877.
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may impose a duty more stringent than embodied in the Code, at
least where violation of court orders are concerned.
One area where confusion abounds concerns an attorney's re-
sponsibility when he knows his client intends to perjure himself.5 7
Perjury is a crime158 and, seemingly, a lawyer has the discretion
to reveal his client's intention to commit it."59 But is such disclo-
sure discretionary or mandatory? For criminal defense attorneys,
the ABA has explicitly outlined how to approach the problem.160
If the defendant insists on perjuring himself, the attorney must
withdraw from the case if possible.' 8 ' If withdrawal is not pos-
sible,1 2 then he must allow the defendant to take the stand,163 and
must confine his examination to identifying the witness as the de-
fendant, then permit him to make his statement. 64 No direct ex-
amination of the witness in the conventional sense is permissible,
nor may an attorney argue the false facts to the jury or recite or
rely on them in his closing argument. 6 5 To do so would be "unpro-
fessional conduct"16 6 and may subject him to discipline.
67
For an attorney involved in civil litigation the course, while
not explicitly charted, seems clear. The Code requires an attorney
to withdraw from employment if "[h] e knows or it is obvious that
his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary
Rule."' 68 DR 7-102(A) provides that a lawyer shall not:
157. Reichstein, The Criminal Law Practitioners Dilemma: What
Should The Lawyer Do When His Client Intends To Testify Falsely?, 60 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1970). Reichstein divided attorneys into two groups:
the first contained a cross-section sampling of one hundred and one Chicago
attorneys; the second consisted of twenty-four attorneys on the Committee
of Professional Ethics of the Chicago Bar Association. Both groups were
asked whether they approved of permitting a client, whom the attorney
knows is guilty, to take the stand to deny his guilt. In the random sample,
58% of the lawyers disapproved, 35% approved and 8% were undecided. In
the ethics group, 46% disapproved, 41% approved, and 13% were undecided.
158. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4902 (1973).
159. ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (C) (3).
160. ABA, TIM PROSECUTON AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, The Defense
Function § 7.7.
161. Id. § 7.7(b).
162. Withdrawal may not be possible if trial has begun or is soon to
begin or, in some states, because the court refuses to allow counsel to with-
draw. See, e.g., PA. R. CRnvi. P. 303 (b).
163. To protect himself the lawyer should have the defendant subscribe
to a file notation, witnessed, if possible, by another lawyer, stating that he
is taking the stand against his attorney's advice. ABA, THE PROSECUTION
AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, The Defense Function § 7.7, Comment at 277.
164. Id. § 7.7(c).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 10.
168. ABA CODE, DR 2-110 (B) (2).
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence
when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is
false.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal ...
Facilitating the use of perjured testimony by putting a client on
the stand knowing he intends to perjure himself appears to violate
all three of the above provisions, which leads to the logical conclu-
sion that the attorney should withdraw. It is difficult to reconcile
the two different approaches to this problem, one for the criminal
attorney and one for the civil attorney, especially in light of the
comment of the ABA Project on Standards For Criminal Justice,
which states, "This [provision] takes into account DR 7-102 (A) (4)
and (7) of the Code of Professional Responsibility."' 69 The most
plausible justification for the different treatment is that the volun-
tary nature of a civil trial for a plaintiff and the absence of criminal
penalties for a defendant might preclude a finding that withdrawal
would be too prejudicial to the client in a civil case, and so prevent
the necessity of letting the client take the stand. In any case, it
is unlikely that the Disciplinary Board would approve of such con-
duct, and if the situation should arise the attorney should withdraw
to protect himself.
C. Information a Lawyer Must Disclose
The Code permits a lawyer to reveal the "[c] onfidences or
secrets [of his client] when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or
required by law or court order."'170 There is one situation under
the Disciplinary Rules where an attorney has the affirmative duty
to do so: DR 7-102 (B) (1) provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing
that
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall
promptly call upon his client to rectify the same,
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tri-
bunal.17
1
169. ABA, THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, The Defense
Function, at 18 (Supp.).
170. ABIA CODE, DR 4-101 (C) (2).
171. Not all states have adopted DR 7-102 (B) (1) in the form originally
proposed. Montana has modified it to require disclosure only to the court.
Washington permits disclosure to the affected party but does not require it.
The District of Columbia only requires an attorney to call upon the client
to rectify the fraud, but does not require the attorney to reveal it if the cli-
ent refuses. Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role For
Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 437, 455 (1974). Pennsylvania has adopted it as
originally proposed. PA. R. Civ. Peoc. 205.
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A recent amendment to the Code, effective March 1, 1974, but not
yet adopted in Pennsylvania, exempts information gained through
privileged communications from the duty to reveal.
17 2
The parameters of DR 7-102 (B) (1) are as yet undefined and
uncertain. Generally, fraud entails any "intentional perversion of
truth."'178 But "actionable fraud" may also result from recklessly
asserting something without any knowledge of its truth.174 And
fraud under the securities laws is sometimes measured by a negli-
gence standard. 175 While it is likely the fraud which is the subject
of DR 7-102 (B) (1) is intentional fraud, 7 6 this is not explicit in
the Code. Nor is the meaning of "clearly establishing" explicit, but
it seems likely that this refers to conclusive proof. 77 It is sub-
mitted that given the nature of the enterprise of disciplining our
legal colleagues there will be reluctance to hold a fellow lawyer
accountable absent the most flagrant violation of this rule, that is,
absent his failure to dislclose his client's intentional fraud when the
information conclusively established its commission.
This duty to disclose affects both general and specialized prac-
tices of law. In general practice, there has been heated discus-
sion 7 s over whether the attorney who knows his client has com-
mitted perjury must inform the court. There is no doubt that ac-
tively advising or employing perjured testimony will result in se-
vere discipline. 79 Likewise, courts have imposed professional disci-
172. ABA 1974 MrDYEAR MEETING, SUMMARY AND REPORTS 3 (1974). The
text of the amendment appears in id., document 127, at 8. For discussion
of information protected as privileged communications see notes 20-49 and
accompanying text supra.
173. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 788 (4th ed. 1968) (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 51.
175. E.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir.
1972).
176. See Lipman, supra note 171 at 461.
177. "Clearly" has been interpreted as meaning "unmistakably." John-
son v. Grady County, 50 Okla. 188, 205, 150 P. 497, 502 (1965). "Establish"
is usually interpreted as "to settle or fix firmly." Thompson v. United
States, 283 F. 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1922). Combining the two interpretations,
the meaning to settle firmly and unmistakably is arrived at, which connotes
conclusive proof.
178. See Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel:
A Symposium, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 8 (1966); Symposium on Professional
Ethics, 64 Micn. L. Rav. 1469 (1966).
179. See, e.g., In re Palmieri, 176 App. Div. 58, 162 N.Y.S. 799, rev'd, 221
N.Y. 611, 117 N.E. 1078 (1917) (attorney disbarred for using a witness' state-
ment which he knew to be false in his argument to the jury; reversed for
insufficient evidence of intentional misconduct); In re Hardenbrook, 135
App. Div. 634, 121 N.Y.S. 250 (1909), aff'd, 199 N.Y. 539, 92 N.E. 1086 (1910)
(attorney disbarred for calling his client to testify knowing he had given
false testimony the previous day).
pline upon attorneys for tacitly permitting their client to testify
falsely.z 0 DR 7-102(b) (1), as it currently reads in Pennsylvania,
reinforces these decisions. But the recent amendment exempting
privileged communications, 181 which is not yet effective in Pennsyl-
vania, clouds the-resolution of this issue because often what clearly
establishes the client's perjury is that the testimony he gives is in-
consistent with what he has told the attorney. If what he has told
the attorney is a privileged communication, it is possible the at-
torney will be precluded from revealing the fraud.
A specialized practice of law that has most acutely felt the sting
of DR 7-102 (B) (1) is the securities bar.18 2 One commentator8 3 as-
serts that the SEC relied heavily on this provision in the much
publicized complaint against the National Student Marketing
Corporation,8 4 where it sought to impose upon attorneys the duty
to protect the investing public at the expense of their clients.
The Code also permits an attorney to make any disclosure that
he is "required by law or court order" to make.8 5 What situations
are encompassed by the phrase "required by law" is uncertain,186
but there is no problem understanding what situations are em-
braced by the phrase "required by court order." When ordered by
a court to reveal information an attorney has no ethical obligation
to refuse, 87 and failure to comply will probably result in a con-
tempt citation. Although there is no ethical requirement to refuse,
one judge'8 8 urges any attorney who believes information which
180. E.g., In re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951) (attorney suspended
for ninety days for permitting his client in a divorce proceeding to falsely
state he owned no property except an old automobile); In re Stein, 1 N.J.
228, 62 A.2d 801 (1949) (attorney disbarred for failing to inform the court
that a former client was being coached by another attorney to testify falsely
to prove desertion to obtain a divorce); In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 322 P.2d
1095 (1953) (attorney suspended for six months for permitting his client to
testify falsely to dates and places where an alleged waiver of notice of a
director's meeting had occurred).
181. See note 172 supra.
182. See Goldberg, Policing Responsibilities of the Securities Bar: The
Attorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional Responsibility-
Considerations for Expertizing Securities Attorneys, 19 N.Y.L.F. 221 (1973);
Lipman, supra note 171.
183. Goldberg, supra note 182, at 236.
184. SEC v. Nat'l Student Marking Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed
Feb. 3, 1972 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,360
noted in 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 122 (1973).
185. ABA CODE, DR 4-101(C) (2).
186. "Required by law" is generally construed to refer to statutory law.
E.g., In re Sorenson's Estate, 195 Misc. 742, 745, 91 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1949).
In Pennsylvania, the Code of Professional Responsibility has been adopted
as a rule of civil procedure. PA. R. Civ. P. 205. Rules of civil procedure
have the effect of statute in Pennsylvania. Iron City Sand & Gravel Co.
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 418 Pa. 145, 208 A.2d 836 (1965); Lojeski v.
Quink, 202 Pa. Super. 471, 198 A.2d 410 (1964). So arguably, any disclosure
required under the Code is a disclosure required by law.
187. See ABA CODE, DR 4-101 (C) (2).
188. People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 101 (1954)
(concurring opinion by Presiding Judge Shinn).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
a court has ordered him to reveal to be privileged to take the con-
tempt citation and appeal to a higher court. This course should
not be too threatening to an attorney. If the appellate court agrees
the desired information was privileged, he is vindicated. And even
if it does not agree, it is unlikely that any court will impose a very
severe penalty on a lawyer who honestly believes the information
to be privileged189 unless the attorney-client privilege is clearly not
applicable to the facts of the case.190
IV. CONCLUSION
While only information protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege is free from compelled disclosure, an attorney's ethical duty
to preserve information obtained because of his relation with a
client extends also to information not entitled to the protection of
the privilege-his client's secrets. The attorney must preserve this
information unless certain circumstances, enumerated in the Code,
exist. Failure to do so will result in discipline. Courts in both
criminal and civil litigation strictly enforce this duty to protect the
client and often disqualify attorneys where a violation of it is pos-
sible.
If one of the exceptional circumstances listed in DR 4-101 (C)
exists, the attorney may reveal the information but only to the ex-
tent necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the revelation
is permitted. No disciplinary action will be taken against an attor-
ney who makes no disclosure when so permitted, and the most
likely function served by these exceptions is as a defense for attor-
neys accused of violating their duty to their client.
There is only one situation listed in the Code where an attor-
ney has an affirmative duty to make a disclosure: when he learns
that his client has committed a fraud in the course of the represen-
tation.19' And this too was circumscribed by a recent amendment
to the Code, not yet effective in Pennsylvania, which exempts the
attorney from this duty if the information is gained as a privileged
communication. The nature of this duty remains nebulous.
Practically speaking, many of the problems surrounding the
duty to preserve information obtained from a client will be resolved
189. "An attorney is entitled to consideration of a claimed privilege not
to disclose information which he honestly regards as confidential and should
not stand in danger of imprisonment for asserting respectfully what he con-
siders to be lawful rights." Appeal of United States Securities & Exchange
Comm'n, 226 F.2d 501, 520 (6th Cir. 1955).
190. Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968).
191. ABA CODE, DR 7-102(b) (1).
privately. But all lawyers should be aware that their duty to their
client is not absolute. And in this era of declining public confidence
in the bar, all lawyers should strive to insure that the duty of confi-
dentiality to a client does not eclipse the rational purposes of that
obligation. Hopefully, this Comment adequately apprises the law-
yer of the limits of his obligation.
JAmEs R. KOLLER
